Big news good and bad
A recent speech by Edward Lucas and Operation Spiderweb (Ukraine's celebration of the anniversary of Russia's Military Transport Aviation)
My inbox this morning was full of big news good, bad, and ugly. (I’ll spare you the ugly.)
Let me however start with a note to readers of my previous post who, understandably, stopped reading before the end of my discussion of the TESCREAL idiocy and comments thereon. What came next was an Aurobindonian assessment of the root cause of this madness and of its eventual cure. Not mentioning this at the outset was bad writing at its finest. If you wish to read the rest, use this link (in most browsers it should take you to the right place).
Now for the bad news, to begin with. It is from a recent speech by Edward Lucas. Lucas, a British writer, journalist, security specialist and politician, is non-resident Senior Fellow at the Center for European Policy Analysis. Until 2018, he was a senior editor at The Economist. Before moving to The Economist, he edited Business Russia and Business Eastern Europe for the Economist Intelligence Unit in Vienna. Here’s what he had to say:
It was not Donald Trump who
made us in this country [the UK] open our financial, and then our political system, to dirty money,
made continental European countries open their energy markets to Russian oil and gas,
made all of us, with a handful of honourable exceptions, cut our defence budgets to the bone and beyond,
made us spend our £60 billion defence budget so badly, leaving us with more admirals than ships, more generals than tanks, aircraft carriers without planes, ships without sailors, planes without pilots, the smallest number of artillery pieces since the 14th century, an army than cannot field a single warfighting division, and ammunition stocks that would run out after a week,
made European defence so utterly dependent on US stockpiles, plans, command and control, intelligence, logistics and firepower, let alone the nuclear umbrella,
made us ignore the repeated warnings — warnings that date back to the early 1990s, from Estonians, Latvians, Lithuanians, Poles and others — that we faced a serious and growing danger from Russia,
issued an invitation to Ukraine to join NATO in 2008 and then failed to support Ukraine when Russia attacked it.
These were all things we did to ourselves.
We did them because we were naïve.
We did them because we were complacent.
Because we were arrogant.
Most of all because we were greedy.
And now we are reaping the consequences.
I’ve spent most of my life dealing with the region we used to call Eastern Europe. I’ve lived behind the Iron Curtain. I’m probably the only person in this room to have been interrogated by the KGB — anyone else want to claim that title? I’ve been arrested, deported, beaten up, spied on. I’ve covered two wars and three revolutions. I’ve fought two libel actions against dangerous Russian oligarchs.
In 2018 I was the first witness to the Intelligence and Security Committee inquiry into Russia, warning Parliament’s most important committee of the dangers to our democracy, protected by both the Official Secrets Act and parliamentary privilege, enabling me to be frank about what I’ve witnessed in a way I cannot be here with you.
I’ve never, ever, been as gloomy as I am now.
The main reason is that the world has changed, it’s changed with lighting speed, and gravely to our peril.
Looking round the room, I do not see anyone even in this venerable company who is likely to have a clear memory of the world before December 11th, 1941. As I will not need to remind you, that was the day when Franklin D. Roosevelt declared war on Nazi Germany. That wartime bond was the foundation of the Anglo-American alliance, the bedrock for decades of what we have come to call the West. It provided the basis for the D-Day landings, for the Marshall Plan and for the reconstruction of Europe after the defeat of the Nazis, for the Berlin Airlift, for the foundation of NATO, for the colossal military and political efforts first not to lose the cold war, and later to win it, for the reconstruction of eastern Europe after the collapse of communism, for the globalised, rules-based system of finance and trade that has brought billions of people out of poverty, and much more besides.
That world ended just under five months ago.
It ended with Donald Trump’s administration voting alongside Russia in the United Nations, against America’s oldest and closest allies, on a question of peace and war in Europe. That was not an aberration. It is part of a pattern....
I am not nostalgic for some mythical golden age of transatlanticism. This has always been a difficult relationship. The US drove the hardest of bargains with this country during the fight against Hitler, and scraped our bones again in the post-war era. Anyone know when we finally finished paying off our wartime debt to the US? (2006)....
We have no shortage of US military blunders that have strained our alliance, and no shortage of diplomatic ones too.... But these difficulties and disagreements were mere nuances compared with what we face now.
You may wonder why I haven’t mentioned Russia. Surely, we should be worrying about the three-year war following the invasion of Ukraine, the war crimes, the kidnapped children, the trillion-dollar bill for damage, the million or so casualties killed and maimed, the millions more traumatised, bereaved, made homeless? Surely, we should worry about Russia’s formidable war machine, the fact that right now, measured by the bang for the buck— or purchasing power parity in economists’ jargon — Russia’s outspends all of Europe on defence.... I’m going to leave the threat from Russia to one side, for a simple reason. The problem is not that Russia is invincible. Russia is not China. It has an economy the size of Italy’s. It has a population one third of the size of Europe’s.
500m Europeans are begging 380m Americans to defend them from 140m Russians, who in the space of three years have not managed to beat 40m Ukrainians. How pathetic is that?
Putin, like his predecessors and perhaps his successors, gets away with his murderous imperialism and military — why? Because he is decisive and we are not. He is willing to take risks and we are not. He will suffer economic pain and we won’t. The problem is not Russia’s strength. It’s our weakness. The war in Ukraine was a catastrophic failure of Western deterrence. We are scared of confronting Russia, and Putin knows it. We were more afraid of Russia defeated than we should be of what is now looming — Russia victorious.
We do not see Russian tanks trundling through the streets of Brussels, Paris, Berlin and Rome. Europe’s governing elite has not been rounded up in the small hours and deported to chop trees in labour camps. Kremlin commissars have not imposed controls on public debate, the media and academia. Nobody risks losing their job for arguing for unity and resolve in standing up to the threats from Washington and Moscow.
In short, nothing is stopping Europe’s leaders from leading, and doing so effectively — except those leaders.
Ukraine bought us time. Paid in blood sweat and tears. We wasted that time. We dithered. We deferred to the Biden administration. It dithered too. We never imposed real sanctions on Russia. We froze the central bank assets — $300bn of them — but we did not seize them. We drip-fed weapons to Ukraine. We drip-fed money. If we had given Ukraine what it needed at the start of the war, the war would be over.
And the world has changed. Trump sees Putin as a friend, and Europe as an enemy.... If we hurl money at the problem, tear up the rule book, sacrifice national pride, we might just be able to replace most of the American military presence in Europe in the space of six or seven years. A decade is much more likely.
But we don’t have a decade. We don’t have even six years. Putin’s war machine runs 24/7. 365 days a year. If we get some kind of ceasefire in Ukraine, Russia’s military readiness rockets upwards. No more losses on the front line. More tanks, more munitions, more vehicles, more rockets more drones, more bombs. And a political imperative to keep the xenophobia and anti-western sentiment at full boil. Don’t for a moment give the Russian people time to think about their crooked and brutal leaders, who have stolen the country’s future.
So whereas we need six years at the absolute minimum to make up for the American withdrawal, Russia can be ready again in two or three years — while Donald Trump is still in the White House. Or even earlier. Europe is getting stronger by the day. Why would Putin wait until we are ready? He does not need to mount a full-scale attack on NATO; he just needs to attack what’s left of NATO’s credibility. A landgrab somewhere in the Baltic states, some islands in the Arctic, the Baltic Sea or elsewhere, followed up by nuclear sabre-rattling, missile test-fires and cyber-attacks. Accept the fait accompli, or face nuclear war.
The point of this attack will not be to gain a bridge, a village, a road or a field. It’s to destroy NATO by exposing our divisions. The countries on the front line will fight. They know what’s at stake. But what about the rest of us? What about the United States? Will this administration really want a full-on confrontation with the Kremlin over what JD Vance will dismiss as a “border skirmish?”
Will the F-35s, the HIMARs, the ATACMs, all the other high-tech American weaponry, running on American guidance systems and American software — will that work when we need it? I wouldn’t bet on it. Moreover, without the United States, NATO’s planning and command apparatus is crippled.
The Baltic states, Poland, Finland, Norway — they’ll be fighting on their own. A big question for this country — will we join them, and risk Russian bombs and rockets landing on our cities too? Remember, our air defences are so weak that we can defend one major city for one day. After that, we are in a worse position than Ukraine.
Putin has the initiative. So does Donald Trump. As I mentioned, his priority, for whatever reason, is friendship with Russia now. He’s prepared to sacrifice Ukraine for that. And, I fear, European allies too. What happens if Trump tells us to make Ukraine submit to whatever deal he cooks up with Putin? We say no, and then what?
That sets the stage for a disorderly, hostile US withdrawal from Europe, a slash and burn in which the US behaves vindictively, petulantly towards the Europeans. If so, we are heading for a collision which we can neither avoid nor survive.
We are caught between the Russian hammer and the American anvil.
And that’s not the worst of it. The sense of betrayal and looming defeat could prompt a political, economic, and social implosion in Ukraine. That would leave an embittered, failing rump state — think of Bosnia, but ten times worse — and millions of furious, miserable refugees heading west, many of them battle-hardened and traumatised. That will be hugely destabilising for all of Europe....
Some of the worst damage is done already. We’ve already sent a deadly message to the world: nuclear blackmail works. Ukraine should never have traded its Soviet-era nuclear arsenal for goodwill and the empty promises of the Budapest Memorandum, signed in 1994. The non-proliferation treaty, let alone hopes of ridding the world of nuclear weapons, is dead, along with the American nuclear guarantee. Countries in Asia (and in Europe) that do not have nuclear weapons are now considering, in great secrecy, if, when and how they should acquire them. It won’t stop there. China and Russia will treat such plans as existential threats and threaten war to stop them. The brinkmanship over the Iranian nuclear program is a mild foretaste of what awaits us in the ruins of Pax Americana.
So how do we deal with all this?
One option is wishful thinking. Many of our allies cannot believe that the US has changed. Like a spouse in an abusive relationship, they make excuses. It must be a misunderstanding. It’s our fault for getting him angry. He loves me really. He’ll come to his senses eventually.
Another option is bravado. Fine, we’ll go it alone. Tell Trump where to get off. Defend Greenland. Send the King to Canada. Match him tariff for tariff. Send a token military force to Ukraine, even without American backing. Cobble together some kind of nuclear deterrent using British submarines and French aircraft. Try some threats — make the US pay for its bases. Make new alliances. Flirt with China.
But when you bluff, you need to think what happens when that bluff is called. In one post on social media, Trump can remove the US nuclear umbrella from Europe, simply by stating that he will not risk World War Three for warmongers. He cannot withdraw from NATO, but he can turn the alliance into an empty shell. American troops in Europe will be back to barracks by nightfall, and home to the US within the year.
If we send our troops to Ukraine, what happens if Russia attacks them? We were not willing to defend Ukraine properly when it was winning. Are we really willing to do it now when Ukraine’s losing?
Britain, as the closest of all American allies, is in the weakest position here....
To be fair, a lot is now happening. The European Commission’s defence white paper is a notable step forward. The Rearmament Bank — a plan I co-authored — is gathering support. Behind the scenes I hear rumbles of hectic discussions on topics ranging from conscription to nuclear weapons.
Politicians will need to talk clearly and firmly about all this to their voters. They should be humble too. All these changes in our defence, deterrence, resilience and security will be far costlier, riskier and more disruptive now. But it all takes time. And we don’t have time.
But there’s one thing we can do right now. It’s to support Ukraine, by far the largest and most battle-hardened armed forces in Europe, by far the most innovative and productive defence industry. A country where people not only believe in our values but are willing to die for them.
If Ukraine wins, we all win. If it loses, we all lose.
I’d like to be optimistic. On paper, we can still turn this round. In practice, I doubt it. Nothing I have seen in the past months and years makes me think we are willing to avert the dangers hurtling towards us. Even less do I think we are ready to survive them.
So much for the bad news. You may be aware by now of the spectacular success of Ukraine’s operation ПАВУТИНА. Here’s Igor Sushko:
On June 1, 2025, Ukraine’s Security Service (SBU) launched a meticulously planned operation codenamed “Spiderweb,” targeting Russian strategic bombers across four airbases — Belaya, Dyagilevo, Ivanovo Severny, and Olenya — spanning 4,000 kilometers from Murmansk to Irkutsk. This operation, which took 1.5 years to prepare under the direct supervision of Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and kept secret even from Ukraine’s allies, marked an unprecedented novel tactic of smuggling 150 drones into Russia.
These drones were concealed within wooden containers mimicking houses on truck beds and simultaneously activated via Russian cellular networks. The drones launched a coordinated attack that struck over 40 Russian aircraft, including critical assets like the A-50 early warning and control aircraft, Tu-95, and Tu-22 M3 bombers. The damage inflicted was extensive, with estimates suggesting a financial impact exceeding $7 billion, but even more critically severely undermining Russia’s strategic aviation capabilities because Russia cannot replace the lost aircraft.
The operation’s success was partly due to the SBU’s ability to transport the drones covertly, using mobile trucks with remotely operable roofs to deploy the drones at the opportune moment. In Irkutsk region, drones exited the parked container one after another, adjacent to the Belaya airbase as onlookers watched helplessly.
The SBU operatives involved in “Operation Spiderweb” had already departed Russia before the attacks commenced, ensuring their safety and the operation’s secrecy. This preemptive evacuation was crucial, as Russian authorities later discovered a warehouse in Chelyabinsk where the drones were loaded into containers but the SBU had vacated the premises in time.
In sum, Ukraine’s Operation Spiderweb is the most innovative and effective in modern warfare, potentially surpassing even the Mossad pager attack on Hezbollah terrorists.
Over 18 months of planning.
Operation carried out of a rented warehouse inside Russia just 6 km from the regional FSB headquarters in Chelyabinsk.
117 attack drones hit 34% of Russia’s strategic bomber fleet across Russia.
Artificial intelligence used to train the drones to identify and target the weakest points of the parked bombers to maximize damage.
All SBU operatives left Russia before the operation commenced.
Attack drones used Russia’s cellular networks for communications.
Over $7 billion in damage to dozens of Russian Tu-95 and Tu-22 strategic bombers and a prized A-50 AWACS aircraft. Russia does not have capability to replace destroyed aircraft in the medium term.
Jason Jay Smart’s account of the operation has additional details:
The operation targeted six of Russia’s most vital military installations, including:
Olenya Air Base (Murmansk Oblast): Home to Tupolev Tu-160 “Blackjack” and Tupolev Tu-95MS “Bear-H” strategic bombers — the airborne backbone of Russia’s nuclear triad. Ukraine’s Defense Intelligence Directorate (GUR) confirmed at least four Tu-95MS bombers destroyed, severely undermining Russia’s second-strike capability.
Severomorsk Naval Base (Murmansk Oblast): Headquarters of Russia’s Northern Fleet and a critical nuclear submarine hub. Multiple explosions rocked the base, and unconfirmed videos suggest damage to a Project 667BDRM “Delfin”-class nuclear ballistic missile submarine — one of Russia’s key sea-based nuclear deterrents.
Dyagilevo Air Base (Ryazan Oblast): Hosting Tupolev Tu-22M3 “Backfire-C” bombers and Ilyushin Il-78 “Midas” aerial refueling tankers, this base’s destruction crippled Russia’s ability to extend its air strike range deep into NATO airspace.
Ivanovo Severny Air Base (Ivanovo Oblast): Destroyed a Beriev A-50 “Mainstay” airborne early warning and control aircraft, effectively blinding Russian air command over large swathes of territory.
Belaya Air Base (Irkutsk Oblast): Three Tu-22M3 bombers destroyed, damaging Russia’s Pacific strike projection.
Voskresensk Airfield (Moscow Region): Destroyed an Ilyushin Il-76 “Candid” strategic airlifter, disrupting logistics and rapid troop deployments.
This operation strikes at the core of Russia’s Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD) doctrine, which depends on the credibility of a retaliatory second strike to deter nuclear war. With 10-15% of its strategic aviation and naval nuclear forces compromised, Russia’s ability to project nuclear power against NATO and to sustain attacks on Ukraine is seriously impaired. The loss of aerial refueling tankers reduces bomber range and effectiveness. The destruction of airborne early warning assets blunts Russia’s air defense coordination. Damage to the Severomorsk naval base threatens the viability of the sea-based second-strike leg — the silent cornerstone of Russia’s nuclear strategy.
Lesia Dubenko adds this juicy bit: June 1 is the anniversary of Russia’s Military Transport Aviation, illustrating that “Ukraine’s sense of humor is very much Mossad-like.”
Update 1 — from Gabrielius Landsbergis: The security guarantees Europe needs are being made in Ukraine
While the world talks, hosts meetings, and forms yet another “coalition of the willing” that mostly leads nowhere — Ukrainians innovate and fight. Without their ingenuity buying us time, we wouldn’t be able to host all those meetings.
If this wasn’t a one-off, but part of a deliberate, multi-layered campaign to degrade Russia’s strategic capacity, then serious alarm bells are now ringing in Moscow. At least among those generals who haven’t yet been fired, given tea or shown a balcony.
Imagine Moscow planning an attack on a Baltic state, knowing it wouldn’t just face Lithuanians, Latvians, Estonians, Poles, or Germans — but also Ukrainians, with all their drone power. That’s a war even Putin might think twice about starting.
Update 2 — from Molly McKew: Operational Art and the Salvation of Ukraine
Pavutyna was Ukraine’s latest act of existential defiance. There was an elegance, a brilliance, to this necessary drone operation which will be the stuff of legend for armies, special operators, intelligence organizations, and guerrilla fighters for generations to come.
June 1, 1996 was [also] the date of removal of the last nuclear warhead that Ukraine agreed to “return” to Russia under the terms of the Budapest Memorandum — an agreement which Ukraine lived up to the terms of, but which Russia and the western signatories promising security guarantees to Ukraine have not. At least some of the aging strategic bombers hit by Ukrainian drones were part of the same strategic arsenal that Ukraine had to “return.
The default western mindset on Russia is a bit like that fancy slime that kids are obsessed with these days — you can pull it and smash it and stretch it to new limits, sometimes it sparkles and exudes soothing odors, but the second the pressure is off, it starts oozing back to its original form of wanting calm and stable relations with a Moscow that has no interest in any such thing.
Russia has been a bogeyman for such a long time. But once the bogeyman is in the house, you can hide under the bed and imagine how much worse it might be, or you can smash a vase into its head and see if it bleeds like the rest of us.
Turns out Russia bleeds.
Ukrainians are amazing in every definition of that word — and every damn day we should consider ourselves lucky that this brave, innovative, persistent, dedicated nation is fighting this war to cripple one of the world’s nominal great military powers to be a free, democratic nation that’s on our team (well, if America decides to stay on the team).
What Ukraine has shown us is we don’t think right about war — strategically, operationally, and tactically — which means we don’t think right about power.
Ukrainian victory remains the shortest and most certain way through this transition in which the free world survives — renewed, reinvigorated, with a new story of victory to carry us on the way — on the other side. The adversaries of democracies understand this. The last American administration did not. The current American administration seems set on a strategy of American irrelevance — can’t someone else do it?