“If you imagine a change as really composed of states, you at once cause insoluble metaphysical problems to arise. They deal only with appearances. You have closed your eyes to true reality” (HB, “The Perception of Change”, Second Lecture)
Bertrand Russell thought that Bergson needed to rely on the concept of duration to avoid falling into the “block universe” trap of mechanism or even teleology (BR, “A History of Western Philosophy”, p. 828). The truth of the matter is that he carefully ignored what Bergson meant at heart, and focused instead on what he said in good style. He didn’t mean to imply that movement can be decomposed into “motions” and “immobilities”, but that we should not attribute to the unity of movement the (dubious) divisibility of space, which is a perfectly valid point. And it was a valid point even before QM. (HB, “The Idea of Duration”, p. 79)
In any case, Russell was right in saying that the ultimate argument for Bergsonism (or for any organic philosophy for that matter) is whether it should appeal to us or not. And we would reply that yes, it lies closer to the idea we have of the living. At which point the reductionist might ask whether it is infinitesimally close, or only asymptotically.. (They always try to get out of a quagmire by pulling their own bootstraps, like Munchausen, a spectacle worth watching).
The discussion at this level is spurious, a different standpoint is needed to approach the “experiential now” of life, which is not within the reach of conceptual analysis. Russell didn’t think that was something philosophy should be concerned with in 1912. Einstein did not see this either after his personal encounter with Bergson, but he could feel it experientially, I’m tempted to guess, perhaps not less as an amateur musician. Nishida understood it better than both in October 1910: “Saggiare nella pratica un concetto [e.g the concept of number] significa chiederci che cosa tramite esso possiamo fare. Dato che il concetto è un simbolo irrigidito e astratto ottenuto in vista di un tale fine, finché lo si usa praticamente non ci sono problemi, ma quando lo si impiega per scopi puramente conoscitivi e si cerca tramite esso di cogliere la realtà concreta in cui si è agito, si cade in errore.” (“Pensiero ed Esperienza Vissuta Corporea”, p.122, Il metodo della filosofia di Bergson).
There is in concrete phenomena (including that of consciousness) a certain depth, a thickness, which remains untouched by the flat mirror of physical law. It is like one of those carefully delineated paintings of Duccio. When presented as a gift to the Pope we might say: It has all been taken care of Your Holiness, we just apologise the artist was unable to fit the Lady and the Child in the centre of the image. It is about high time we place the Madonna and Child in the centre of the image.
“If you imagine a change as really composed of states, you at once cause insoluble metaphysical problems to arise. They deal only with appearances. You have closed your eyes to true reality” (HB, “The Perception of Change”, Second Lecture)
Bertrand Russell thought that Bergson needed to rely on the concept of duration to avoid falling into the “block universe” trap of mechanism or even teleology (BR, “A History of Western Philosophy”, p. 828). The truth of the matter is that he carefully ignored what Bergson meant at heart, and focused instead on what he said in good style. He didn’t mean to imply that movement can be decomposed into “motions” and “immobilities”, but that we should not attribute to the unity of movement the (dubious) divisibility of space, which is a perfectly valid point. And it was a valid point even before QM. (HB, “The Idea of Duration”, p. 79)
In any case, Russell was right in saying that the ultimate argument for Bergsonism (or for any organic philosophy for that matter) is whether it should appeal to us or not. And we would reply that yes, it lies closer to the idea we have of the living. At which point the reductionist might ask whether it is infinitesimally close, or only asymptotically.. (They always try to get out of a quagmire by pulling their own bootstraps, like Munchausen, a spectacle worth watching).
The discussion at this level is spurious, a different standpoint is needed to approach the “experiential now” of life, which is not within the reach of conceptual analysis. Russell didn’t think that was something philosophy should be concerned with in 1912. Einstein did not see this either after his personal encounter with Bergson, but he could feel it experientially, I’m tempted to guess, perhaps not less as an amateur musician. Nishida understood it better than both in October 1910: “Saggiare nella pratica un concetto [e.g the concept of number] significa chiederci che cosa tramite esso possiamo fare. Dato che il concetto è un simbolo irrigidito e astratto ottenuto in vista di un tale fine, finché lo si usa praticamente non ci sono problemi, ma quando lo si impiega per scopi puramente conoscitivi e si cerca tramite esso di cogliere la realtà concreta in cui si è agito, si cade in errore.” (“Pensiero ed Esperienza Vissuta Corporea”, p.122, Il metodo della filosofia di Bergson).
There is in concrete phenomena (including that of consciousness) a certain depth, a thickness, which remains untouched by the flat mirror of physical law. It is like one of those carefully delineated paintings of Duccio. When presented as a gift to the Pope we might say: It has all been taken care of Your Holiness, we just apologise the artist was unable to fit the Lady and the Child in the centre of the image. It is about high time we place the Madonna and Child in the centre of the image.