It would be interesting to know what was or is the state of mind or the psychological situation of the human being when (pro-)posing the question of fortuity or causality.
What is the motivation behind these statements? Because I will get the answer that corresponds to what motivates me to ask the question. Depending on my situation that conditions the question, one of the four cases according to Nagarjuna's tetralemma will appear and my mind will project the appropriate answer. In terms of my preferred language, for example quantum physics, metaphors will come up building the bridge to the "already known" but not manifested.
Your logic, as that of Nishida’s, is a logic of the predicate. I do not know of anyone else’s apart from those two, at least in a complete form, but the fact is that this has been proven to be entirely self-consistent. Aristotelian logic, and the same goes from the scholastics to the common man (if there is anything that can be called common in a physicist) is a logic of the subject. As you clearly pointed out: “The interpretation of such chains as permanent beings, therefore, is but a futile attempt to make quantum phenomena conform to the object-oriented language of classical discourse.”
For Aristotle, subject is that from which everything else is predicted, without it in itself being the predicate of anything (Categories, II 1a20). It is what Spinoza defined as “substancia” at the beginning of his Ética (III): “aquello que es en sí y se concibe por sí”.
Now, if we approach reality from a different angle, we might rather say that the subject is contained within the universal, that “the predicate BECOMES that which contains the subject”, which is the same as saying that predication is in reality form of self-relation, where a specific property manifests itself out of a universal. When a value is indicated, that might not necessarily be read as implying the existence of a substance that upholds the property beyond specific experimental conditions but, for the sake of an example, we might rather say that such a thing as the “Spin” becomes a predicate in relation to itself. That is, “Spin” becomes “up” or “down”. That simply means that predication, even in the subjunctive statement, is in reality a self-relation, where something immanent becomes manifest. “Prédiquer signifie que l’universel s’examine en lui-même, que le concept retourne à sa propre essence.”
I would struggle to find better description than Nishida’s himself: “Lorsque nous
disons «cette chose est rouge», ce n'est pas du «ceci » que nous faisons un sujet, mais probablement du «rouge» déterminé. Ce rouge doit être une qualité, une chose pouvant devenir prédicat. Ce n'est pas de la matière que nous faisons un sujet, mais de la forme; autrement dit, c’est l'universel qui devient le sujet. Évidemment, en faisant du particulier qu’est ce rouge le sujet, le rouge en général devient un prédicat à propos de soi-même. Cependant, lorsque nous disons «ce rouge», il est déjà universalisé par le concept de couleur.”
This last point is obviously the crucial one, which leads to the concept of “place”(Basho) which he identified initially with Maxwell’s field of force, somehow misleadingly, and it needs to be read in the un-reified way you normally present the idea of field of course. Place is the “universal of universals”, to paraphrase NK; quite close to the Platonist concept of “Khôra”.
Why do you still believe in stirct causality?
It would be interesting to know what was or is the state of mind or the psychological situation of the human being when (pro-)posing the question of fortuity or causality.
What is the motivation behind these statements? Because I will get the answer that corresponds to what motivates me to ask the question. Depending on my situation that conditions the question, one of the four cases according to Nagarjuna's tetralemma will appear and my mind will project the appropriate answer. In terms of my preferred language, for example quantum physics, metaphors will come up building the bridge to the "already known" but not manifested.
Viele Grüsse,
Andreas Freund
Your logic, as that of Nishida’s, is a logic of the predicate. I do not know of anyone else’s apart from those two, at least in a complete form, but the fact is that this has been proven to be entirely self-consistent. Aristotelian logic, and the same goes from the scholastics to the common man (if there is anything that can be called common in a physicist) is a logic of the subject. As you clearly pointed out: “The interpretation of such chains as permanent beings, therefore, is but a futile attempt to make quantum phenomena conform to the object-oriented language of classical discourse.”
For Aristotle, subject is that from which everything else is predicted, without it in itself being the predicate of anything (Categories, II 1a20). It is what Spinoza defined as “substancia” at the beginning of his Ética (III): “aquello que es en sí y se concibe por sí”.
Now, if we approach reality from a different angle, we might rather say that the subject is contained within the universal, that “the predicate BECOMES that which contains the subject”, which is the same as saying that predication is in reality form of self-relation, where a specific property manifests itself out of a universal. When a value is indicated, that might not necessarily be read as implying the existence of a substance that upholds the property beyond specific experimental conditions but, for the sake of an example, we might rather say that such a thing as the “Spin” becomes a predicate in relation to itself. That is, “Spin” becomes “up” or “down”. That simply means that predication, even in the subjunctive statement, is in reality a self-relation, where something immanent becomes manifest. “Prédiquer signifie que l’universel s’examine en lui-même, que le concept retourne à sa propre essence.”
I would struggle to find better description than Nishida’s himself: “Lorsque nous
disons «cette chose est rouge», ce n'est pas du «ceci » que nous faisons un sujet, mais probablement du «rouge» déterminé. Ce rouge doit être une qualité, une chose pouvant devenir prédicat. Ce n'est pas de la matière que nous faisons un sujet, mais de la forme; autrement dit, c’est l'universel qui devient le sujet. Évidemment, en faisant du particulier qu’est ce rouge le sujet, le rouge en général devient un prédicat à propos de soi-même. Cependant, lorsque nous disons «ce rouge», il est déjà universalisé par le concept de couleur.”
This last point is obviously the crucial one, which leads to the concept of “place”(Basho) which he identified initially with Maxwell’s field of force, somehow misleadingly, and it needs to be read in the un-reified way you normally present the idea of field of course. Place is the “universal of universals”, to paraphrase NK; quite close to the Platonist concept of “Khôra”.
Best,
Adrian