To Niels Bohr, as to Kant before him, the ability to attribute properties to substances, and to connect them according to the principle of causality, were preconditions of the possibility of objective knowledge. “The objective character of the description in atomic physics depends on the detailed specification of the experimental conditions under which evidence is gained,” he wrote. A detailed specification of these conditions can only be given if it is possible to describe them in terms of property-carrying substances conforming to causal laws.
The correlations between property-indicating events (or measurement outcomes), on the other hand, cannot be formulated (let alone explained) in terms of objects interacting and changing according to causal laws. This is why to Bohr, “the physical content of quantum mechanics is exhausted by its power to formulate statistical laws governing observations obtained under conditions specified in plain language.”
While most interpreters of quantum mechanics believe in the law of causality (imagining that quantum states / wave functions evolve deterministically at least most of the time), Bohr did not and neither do I. You might want to take a look at my previous post: https://aurocafe.substack.com/p/quantum-mechanics-and-consciousness
“The mind has never anything present to it but the perceptions, and cannot possibly reach any experience of their connexion with objects. The supposition of such a connexion is, therefore, without any foundation in reasoning.” (Hume, Enquiries concerning Human Understanding and concerning the Principles of Morals, pp. 152-153. Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1975)
I believe however that Kant’s understanding of causality as a precondition of the possibility of empirical science represents a great advance on Hume. Bohr’s advance on Kant is moderate in comparison. See my https://aurocafe.substack.com/p/the-genius-that-was-niels-bohr
I need to add a few words to my earlier reply. As I hinted in this letter, when it comes to property-indicating events or measurement outcomes, two kinds of causality need to be considered: a causality which would be responsible for the particular property or outcome indicated by such an event, and a causality which would be responsible for the occurrence of such an event (no matter what outcome it indicates). If I am inclined to postulate a causal agent for the latter, it is in part because I can’t see a reason for the fortuitousness of such an event. On the other hand, there is a very good reason for the event's indeterminacy with respect to the property indicated. It consists in the quantum indeterminacy pointed out in this post: https://aurocafe.substack.com/p/how-to-fluff-out-matter, which accounts for the statistical nature of quantum mechanics.
Thank you for your clarifications.. I believe strongly that the fortuitousness of events stems from the circumstance that it is not matter which generates an illusion of consciousness but it is consciousness which generates an illusion of matter. This view is supported by a huge number of paaranormal experiences which demonstrate that mind has influence on the physical "outer world".
If it were a simple choice between matter creates consciousness and consciousness creates matter, I would totally agree with you. (Needless to say, matter cannot create the *illusion* of consciousness since it takes consciousness to have illusions.) However, the meaning of “matter” is not the same in both cases. In the first case it stands for something that creates conscious experience but is not itself experienced; in the second case it is something constructed on the basis of our experiences which we objectivize. In these posts I have indicated how these two “somethings” might be related:
It would be interesting to know what was or is the state of mind or the psychological situation of the human being when (pro-)posing the question of fortuity or causality.
What is the motivation behind these statements? Because I will get the answer that corresponds to what motivates me to ask the question. Depending on my situation that conditions the question, one of the four cases according to Nagarjuna's tetralemma will appear and my mind will project the appropriate answer. In terms of my preferred language, for example quantum physics, metaphors will come up building the bridge to the "already known" but not manifested.
According to my experience it can be quite as simple as that, but it can also be much less simple depending on my perception that is conditioned by my mental structure, and on the specific situation. The "how" and the "who" are entangled.
Example: I deeply wanted to transcend the limits of physics, constructs of the human mind. I imagined that I am facing the wall of light representing these limits (e.g. velocity of light) - the metaphor emerged. A few years after my PhD in physics, walking through the streets of Paris my attention was attracted by a bookstore. Behind the window I saw Alexandre Kalda's book "Le mur de lumière", ("The wall of light"). The author had disappeared in the sea close to Pondichéry. His body has never been found. He belonged to Sri Aurobindo's ashram. Inspired by the book I travelled to Auroville and visited the ashram and the Matrimandir. A few years later I was initiated by Sri Tathata in Karnataka. Fortuitous or not? Synchronicity? Interesting questions, but not essential. Secondary with respect to the direct experience of the "flow" when consciousness is in the "Bindu", linking the visible and the invisible. And so on.
As Richard Feynman said: "Science is the belief in the ignorance of the experts. Life is experience".
Here is an interesting paper with respect to causality:
Some synchronicity, I’d say! I knew A.K. quite well. Here in Pondicherry he was known as Archaka. We lived in the same house for many years, from his arrival in Pondicherry in the mid ‘70s till his death in the mid ‘90s. It isn’t true that his body has never been found. He went for a swim in the sea almost daily. Interestingly, he didn’t drown: autopsy found no water in his lungs. A close friend of his told me that some days before his death he saw himself in a dream floating spread-eagled on the water, said he wanted to try that.
Your logic, as that of Nishida’s, is a logic of the predicate. I do not know of anyone else’s apart from those two, at least in a complete form, but the fact is that this has been proven to be entirely self-consistent. Aristotelian logic, and the same goes from the scholastics to the common man (if there is anything that can be called common in a physicist) is a logic of the subject. As you clearly pointed out: “The interpretation of such chains as permanent beings, therefore, is but a futile attempt to make quantum phenomena conform to the object-oriented language of classical discourse.”
For Aristotle, subject is that from which everything else is predicted, without it in itself being the predicate of anything (Categories, II 1a20). It is what Spinoza defined as “substancia” at the beginning of his Ética (III): “aquello que es en sí y se concibe por sí”.
Now, if we approach reality from a different angle, we might rather say that the subject is contained within the universal, that “the predicate BECOMES that which contains the subject”, which is the same as saying that predication is in reality form of self-relation, where a specific property manifests itself out of a universal. When a value is indicated, that might not necessarily be read as implying the existence of a substance that upholds the property beyond specific experimental conditions but, for the sake of an example, we might rather say that such a thing as the “Spin” becomes a predicate in relation to itself. That is, “Spin” becomes “up” or “down”. That simply means that predication, even in the subjunctive statement, is in reality a self-relation, where something immanent becomes manifest. “Prédiquer signifie que l’universel s’examine en lui-même, que le concept retourne à sa propre essence.”
I would struggle to find better description than Nishida’s himself: “Lorsque nous
disons «cette chose est rouge», ce n'est pas du «ceci » que nous faisons un sujet, mais probablement du «rouge» déterminé. Ce rouge doit être une qualité, une chose pouvant devenir prédicat. Ce n'est pas de la matière que nous faisons un sujet, mais de la forme; autrement dit, c’est l'universel qui devient le sujet. Évidemment, en faisant du particulier qu’est ce rouge le sujet, le rouge en général devient un prédicat à propos de soi-même. Cependant, lorsque nous disons «ce rouge», il est déjà universalisé par le concept de couleur.”
This last point is obviously the crucial one, which leads to the concept of “place”(Basho) which he identified initially with Maxwell’s field of force, somehow misleadingly, and it needs to be read in the un-reified way you normally present the idea of field of course. Place is the “universal of universals”, to paraphrase NK; quite close to the Platonist concept of “Khôra”.
My point indeed! Talk about predicates (indicated by contextual measurements) is still talk about subjects, for how can there be predicates without objects/substances of which they are the predicates? So talk about predicates is still one concession too many to the object-oriented language of classical discourse, since objects can be constructed only FAPP, from predicates that are predicates only FAPP.
By the way, It would help me if you would add citations to your quotations of Nishida Kitaro.
Starting from the last one cited, and some other specific discussions around predication (ignoring everything else, which would go too much off topic), plus some of the Kant comments (out of the many..). All in all, I’m only referring to primary sources, not secondary literature which we can go on forever. Then some comments I made about his encounter with Bohr and Einstein. That would cover the main points I think. But if you decide to dive deeper, my only advice would be, no matter where you start or when you do it, he goes round in circles from day one so you will always get back to the same point at the end. Someone said of ANW that reading him was like going out whale watching. You are in the open sea, navigating for hours on end and all of a sudden someone shouts: “He has come out! He has come out!”, and it’s a beautiful view. With Nishida it is the same, the only difference is that he NEVER comes out, you have to dive yourself.
- “De ce qui agit à ce qui voit” Trad. J Tremblay, 2015 PUM.
I,4, p. 123-124, 50, 118, on predication
I,3, p. 83-84 on Kant (but it’s everywhere really)
- “Intuition and Reflection in Self-Consciousness” Trad. Viglielmo, 2020 Chisokudo.
IV, 40-41, p. 141, on predication
- “Intelligibility and the Philosophy of Nothingness” Trad. R Schinzinger, 1958 Pantianos.
III, p.83, predication, all of it. An essay that starts by saying “The world of reality is a world where things are acting on things.. But this mutual acting of things means that things deny themselves, and that the thing-character is lost”, might sound familiar!
- “La Science Expérimentale” Trad. M Dalissier, 2010 L’Harmattan.
IV, p. 25, 28-29, 31, 56, 81, 278 on Bridgman operationalism, Schrödinger, absolute present, de Broglie and Bohr.
- “Problemi Fondamenti della Filosofia” Trad. E Fongaro, 2014 Marsilio.
I, p. 77-81, 85, 91, 113-117, 125, 128, 134-135, 158, etc, on predication
II, p. 119 on field theory (basho explained in the previous 3 pages)
II, p.123 a nice simile with your vertical/horizontal axis, for NK time is vertically linear and space horizontally circularly determined
- “Art and Morality” Trad. D Dilworth, 1973 UPH.
7, p. 42, 135 on predication
7, p. 128,129,132 my comment about limit and “the act underlying all acts”
- “Pensiero ed Esperienza Vissuta Corporea” Trad. E Fongaro, 2019 Mimesis.
- “Auroéveil. Le systéme des universels” Trad. J Tremblay, 2017 Chisokudo.
- “La Détermination du néant marquée par l’autoévil” Trad. J Tremblay, 2019 Chisokudo.
- “Problèmes fundamentaux de la philosophie I” Trad. J Tremblay, 2020 Chisokudo.
- “Place & Dialectic” Trad. J Krummel, 2012 OUP.
- “Last Writings” Trad. D Dilworth, 1987 UHP.
Btw, the subject that is contained in the predicate is a “limit” of attribution, similar to the limit conditions we impose on QM at a macroscopic level, it is not an absolute relation that remains fixed for all subjects and properties. The predicate that would never become a subject, and in that sense “would never become a concession to dualism” is called Absolute Nothingness. It’s not a nothing that is opposed to being, like that of non-being, which is only a relative nothingness, but one that encompass the two. That place where you mentioned there is still a concession is called by NK “oppositional nothingness”, as the field of consciousness where subject and object become related and judgements occur.
Why do you still believe in stirct causality?
Thanks for asking!
I don’t.
To Niels Bohr, as to Kant before him, the ability to attribute properties to substances, and to connect them according to the principle of causality, were preconditions of the possibility of objective knowledge. “The objective character of the description in atomic physics depends on the detailed specification of the experimental conditions under which evidence is gained,” he wrote. A detailed specification of these conditions can only be given if it is possible to describe them in terms of property-carrying substances conforming to causal laws.
The correlations between property-indicating events (or measurement outcomes), on the other hand, cannot be formulated (let alone explained) in terms of objects interacting and changing according to causal laws. This is why to Bohr, “the physical content of quantum mechanics is exhausted by its power to formulate statistical laws governing observations obtained under conditions specified in plain language.”
While most interpreters of quantum mechanics believe in the law of causality (imagining that quantum states / wave functions evolve deterministically at least most of the time), Bohr did not and neither do I. You might want to take a look at my previous post: https://aurocafe.substack.com/p/quantum-mechanics-and-consciousness
I like Hume's formulation of the problem of causation.
I like to cite this:
“The mind has never anything present to it but the perceptions, and cannot possibly reach any experience of their connexion with objects. The supposition of such a connexion is, therefore, without any foundation in reasoning.” (Hume, Enquiries concerning Human Understanding and concerning the Principles of Morals, pp. 152-153. Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1975)
I believe however that Kant’s understanding of causality as a precondition of the possibility of empirical science represents a great advance on Hume. Bohr’s advance on Kant is moderate in comparison. See my https://aurocafe.substack.com/p/the-genius-that-was-niels-bohr
Hi Kurt,
I need to add a few words to my earlier reply. As I hinted in this letter, when it comes to property-indicating events or measurement outcomes, two kinds of causality need to be considered: a causality which would be responsible for the particular property or outcome indicated by such an event, and a causality which would be responsible for the occurrence of such an event (no matter what outcome it indicates). If I am inclined to postulate a causal agent for the latter, it is in part because I can’t see a reason for the fortuitousness of such an event. On the other hand, there is a very good reason for the event's indeterminacy with respect to the property indicated. It consists in the quantum indeterminacy pointed out in this post: https://aurocafe.substack.com/p/how-to-fluff-out-matter, which accounts for the statistical nature of quantum mechanics.
Thank you for your clarifications.. I believe strongly that the fortuitousness of events stems from the circumstance that it is not matter which generates an illusion of consciousness but it is consciousness which generates an illusion of matter. This view is supported by a huge number of paaranormal experiences which demonstrate that mind has influence on the physical "outer world".
Hi again,
If it were a simple choice between matter creates consciousness and consciousness creates matter, I would totally agree with you. (Needless to say, matter cannot create the *illusion* of consciousness since it takes consciousness to have illusions.) However, the meaning of “matter” is not the same in both cases. In the first case it stands for something that creates conscious experience but is not itself experienced; in the second case it is something constructed on the basis of our experiences which we objectivize. In these posts I have indicated how these two “somethings” might be related:
https://aurocafe.substack.com/p/a-reality-worth-being-part-of
https://aurocafe.substack.com/p/the-paradox-of-human-subjectivity
https://aurocafe.substack.com/p/intentionality-or-the-problem-of
It would be interesting to know what was or is the state of mind or the psychological situation of the human being when (pro-)posing the question of fortuity or causality.
What is the motivation behind these statements? Because I will get the answer that corresponds to what motivates me to ask the question. Depending on my situation that conditions the question, one of the four cases according to Nagarjuna's tetralemma will appear and my mind will project the appropriate answer. In terms of my preferred language, for example quantum physics, metaphors will come up building the bridge to the "already known" but not manifested.
Viele Grüsse,
Andreas Freund
Perhaps it is not quite as simple as that?
According to my experience it can be quite as simple as that, but it can also be much less simple depending on my perception that is conditioned by my mental structure, and on the specific situation. The "how" and the "who" are entangled.
Example: I deeply wanted to transcend the limits of physics, constructs of the human mind. I imagined that I am facing the wall of light representing these limits (e.g. velocity of light) - the metaphor emerged. A few years after my PhD in physics, walking through the streets of Paris my attention was attracted by a bookstore. Behind the window I saw Alexandre Kalda's book "Le mur de lumière", ("The wall of light"). The author had disappeared in the sea close to Pondichéry. His body has never been found. He belonged to Sri Aurobindo's ashram. Inspired by the book I travelled to Auroville and visited the ashram and the Matrimandir. A few years later I was initiated by Sri Tathata in Karnataka. Fortuitous or not? Synchronicity? Interesting questions, but not essential. Secondary with respect to the direct experience of the "flow" when consciousness is in the "Bindu", linking the visible and the invisible. And so on.
As Richard Feynman said: "Science is the belief in the ignorance of the experts. Life is experience".
Here is an interesting paper with respect to causality:
https://www.academia.edu/16349860/Bohms_Quantum_Causality_and_Its_Parallels_in_Kants_Ideas_of_Reason?email_work_card=view-paper
Some synchronicity, I’d say! I knew A.K. quite well. Here in Pondicherry he was known as Archaka. We lived in the same house for many years, from his arrival in Pondicherry in the mid ‘70s till his death in the mid ‘90s. It isn’t true that his body has never been found. He went for a swim in the sea almost daily. Interestingly, he didn’t drown: autopsy found no water in his lungs. A close friend of his told me that some days before his death he saw himself in a dream floating spread-eagled on the water, said he wanted to try that.
Regarding the Bohm paper see my https://aurocafe.substack.com/p/the-world-according-to-bohmian-mechanics
Yes, indeed! Thank you for the accurate information regarding Archaka's death. And for the link to your text on Bohmian mechanics.
I have the following question: "Aurobindo" makes me think of "Golden Bindu". Is there any hint for such a signification?
Aurobindo is the Bengali version of the Hindi name Aravinda, which means lotus. No connection to either gold or bindu.
Thanks. Now, if the centre of the lotus represents the bindu and the petals the many worlds ... OK, this is called wishful thinking.
Your logic, as that of Nishida’s, is a logic of the predicate. I do not know of anyone else’s apart from those two, at least in a complete form, but the fact is that this has been proven to be entirely self-consistent. Aristotelian logic, and the same goes from the scholastics to the common man (if there is anything that can be called common in a physicist) is a logic of the subject. As you clearly pointed out: “The interpretation of such chains as permanent beings, therefore, is but a futile attempt to make quantum phenomena conform to the object-oriented language of classical discourse.”
For Aristotle, subject is that from which everything else is predicted, without it in itself being the predicate of anything (Categories, II 1a20). It is what Spinoza defined as “substancia” at the beginning of his Ética (III): “aquello que es en sí y se concibe por sí”.
Now, if we approach reality from a different angle, we might rather say that the subject is contained within the universal, that “the predicate BECOMES that which contains the subject”, which is the same as saying that predication is in reality form of self-relation, where a specific property manifests itself out of a universal. When a value is indicated, that might not necessarily be read as implying the existence of a substance that upholds the property beyond specific experimental conditions but, for the sake of an example, we might rather say that such a thing as the “Spin” becomes a predicate in relation to itself. That is, “Spin” becomes “up” or “down”. That simply means that predication, even in the subjunctive statement, is in reality a self-relation, where something immanent becomes manifest. “Prédiquer signifie que l’universel s’examine en lui-même, que le concept retourne à sa propre essence.”
I would struggle to find better description than Nishida’s himself: “Lorsque nous
disons «cette chose est rouge», ce n'est pas du «ceci » que nous faisons un sujet, mais probablement du «rouge» déterminé. Ce rouge doit être une qualité, une chose pouvant devenir prédicat. Ce n'est pas de la matière que nous faisons un sujet, mais de la forme; autrement dit, c’est l'universel qui devient le sujet. Évidemment, en faisant du particulier qu’est ce rouge le sujet, le rouge en général devient un prédicat à propos de soi-même. Cependant, lorsque nous disons «ce rouge», il est déjà universalisé par le concept de couleur.”
This last point is obviously the crucial one, which leads to the concept of “place”(Basho) which he identified initially with Maxwell’s field of force, somehow misleadingly, and it needs to be read in the un-reified way you normally present the idea of field of course. Place is the “universal of universals”, to paraphrase NK; quite close to the Platonist concept of “Khôra”.
Best,
Adrian
My point indeed! Talk about predicates (indicated by contextual measurements) is still talk about subjects, for how can there be predicates without objects/substances of which they are the predicates? So talk about predicates is still one concession too many to the object-oriented language of classical discourse, since objects can be constructed only FAPP, from predicates that are predicates only FAPP.
By the way, It would help me if you would add citations to your quotations of Nishida Kitaro.
Starting from the last one cited, and some other specific discussions around predication (ignoring everything else, which would go too much off topic), plus some of the Kant comments (out of the many..). All in all, I’m only referring to primary sources, not secondary literature which we can go on forever. Then some comments I made about his encounter with Bohr and Einstein. That would cover the main points I think. But if you decide to dive deeper, my only advice would be, no matter where you start or when you do it, he goes round in circles from day one so you will always get back to the same point at the end. Someone said of ANW that reading him was like going out whale watching. You are in the open sea, navigating for hours on end and all of a sudden someone shouts: “He has come out! He has come out!”, and it’s a beautiful view. With Nishida it is the same, the only difference is that he NEVER comes out, you have to dive yourself.
- “De ce qui agit à ce qui voit” Trad. J Tremblay, 2015 PUM.
I,4, p. 123-124, 50, 118, on predication
I,3, p. 83-84 on Kant (but it’s everywhere really)
- “Intuition and Reflection in Self-Consciousness” Trad. Viglielmo, 2020 Chisokudo.
IV, 40-41, p. 141, on predication
- “Intelligibility and the Philosophy of Nothingness” Trad. R Schinzinger, 1958 Pantianos.
III, p.83, predication, all of it. An essay that starts by saying “The world of reality is a world where things are acting on things.. But this mutual acting of things means that things deny themselves, and that the thing-character is lost”, might sound familiar!
- “La Science Expérimentale” Trad. M Dalissier, 2010 L’Harmattan.
IV, p. 25, 28-29, 31, 56, 81, 278 on Bridgman operationalism, Schrödinger, absolute present, de Broglie and Bohr.
- “Problemi Fondamenti della Filosofia” Trad. E Fongaro, 2014 Marsilio.
I, p. 77-81, 85, 91, 113-117, 125, 128, 134-135, 158, etc, on predication
II, p. 119 on field theory (basho explained in the previous 3 pages)
II, p.123 a nice simile with your vertical/horizontal axis, for NK time is vertically linear and space horizontally circularly determined
- “Art and Morality” Trad. D Dilworth, 1973 UPH.
7, p. 42, 135 on predication
7, p. 128,129,132 my comment about limit and “the act underlying all acts”
- “Pensiero ed Esperienza Vissuta Corporea” Trad. E Fongaro, 2019 Mimesis.
- “Auroéveil. Le systéme des universels” Trad. J Tremblay, 2017 Chisokudo.
- “La Détermination du néant marquée par l’autoévil” Trad. J Tremblay, 2019 Chisokudo.
- “Problèmes fundamentaux de la philosophie I” Trad. J Tremblay, 2020 Chisokudo.
- “Place & Dialectic” Trad. J Krummel, 2012 OUP.
- “Last Writings” Trad. D Dilworth, 1987 UHP.
Btw, the subject that is contained in the predicate is a “limit” of attribution, similar to the limit conditions we impose on QM at a macroscopic level, it is not an absolute relation that remains fixed for all subjects and properties. The predicate that would never become a subject, and in that sense “would never become a concession to dualism” is called Absolute Nothingness. It’s not a nothing that is opposed to being, like that of non-being, which is only a relative nothingness, but one that encompass the two. That place where you mentioned there is still a concession is called by NK “oppositional nothingness”, as the field of consciousness where subject and object become related and judgements occur.
Best,
A
Thank you so much!
A small (but important) correction. When I said a logic “of” the predicate, I meant a logic “in the direction of” the predicate, obviously.